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Abstract
■ Our intuitive concept of the relations between brain and
mind is increasingly challenged by the scientific world view.
Yet, although few neuroscientists openly endorse Cartesian
dualism, careful reading reveals dualistic intuitions in promi-
nent neuroscientific texts. Here, we present the “double-subject
fallacy”: treating the brain and the entire person as two inde-
pendent subjects who can simultaneously occupy divergent
psychological states and even have complex interactions with
each other—as in “my brain knew before I did.” Although at
first, such writing may appear like harmless, or even cute, short-
hand, a closer look suggests that it can be seriously misleading.
Surprisingly, this confused writing appears in various cognitive-
neuroscience texts, from prominent peer-reviewed articles to
books intended for lay audience. Far from being merely meta-
phorical or figurative, this type of writing demonstrates that
dualistic intuitions are still deeply rooted in contemporary
thought, affecting even the most rigorous practitioners of the
neuroscientific method. We discuss the origins of such writing
and its effects on the scientific arena as well as demonstrate its
relevance to the debate on legal and moral responsibility. ■
CLOSET DUALISM AND THE DOUBLE-SUBJECT
FALLACY IN NEUROSCIENTIFIC WRITING
When the term “neuroscience” was coined about 60 years
ago (Bechtel, 2009), few understood the revolution this
discipline would bring about. With our expanding under-
standing of the brain, cognitive neuroscience has become
a tool for better theorization of the mind. As part of that
process, issues formerly considered “unscientific,” such as
the nature of consciousness or the existence of free will,
have become legitimate foci of cutting-edge neuroscien-
tific research (e.g., Poldrack, 2011; Cerf et al., 2010; Soon,
Brass, Heinze, & Haynes, 2008). This “neuralization of the
mind” (for a discussion, see Gold & Stoljar, 1999) may
transform the way we think about mind–brain relations.
If successful, it could yield cognitive-neuroscientific theo-
ries that will eventually replace the traditional, everyday
intuitions that are typically rooted in more dualistic world
views (Bloom, 2005; Damasio, 1994). Yet, surprisingly
enough, careful reading of some prominent neuroscien-
tific texts reveals that such a transformation has yet to be
completed even within the brain sciences.
Although only few neuroscientists explicitly endorse
Cartesian dualism (i.e., the idea that the mental and physi-
cal are two different substances, which can nevertheless
interact), some prominent neuroscientific writing still
expresses implicit dualistic intuitions. We exemplify this
here with a key fallacy: ascribing divergent, even oppos-
ing, psychological states to the brain and to the person
to whom the brain belongs. Hence, the brain is personi-
fied and, at the same time, it is differentiated from the
“conscious self,” so the brain and the self are described
as two intentional subjects that may interact with one
another and have different mental states.1 Accordingly,
we designate it the double-subject fallacy (DSF). For
example: “the brain knows our decisions before we do”
(Gazzaniga, 2000, p. 145) or “Our brain doesnʼt tell us
everything it knows. And sometimes it goes further and
actively misleads us” (Frith, 2007, p. 47). Table 1 lists more
examples and suggests ways to rephrase DSF writing to
eliminate the fallacy.
This type of writing might be claimed to be humorous
or metaphorical shorthand that should be unpacked by
the reader. We argue otherwise. First, DSF writing does
not conform to any prominent theory of metaphors and
their usage. Typically, metaphors, like “time is a river” or
“conscience is a manʼs compass,” are sentences in which
a word or phrase that literally denotes one thing (a river
or a compass, in the examples above) is used to denote
another thing (time or conscience, respectively), thereby
implicitly introducing a parallel between the two (Turner
& Fauconnier, 2002; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). However,
in DSF writing, both the brain and the self (as well as the
physical predicates assigned to them) are literally refer-
enced: In sentences like “the brain decided before you
did,” for example, the brain is held to (literally) decide,
and the person is held to (literally) decide later. There
is no nonliteral meaning to any of the terms.
Second, beyond this more technical point, we claim
that even if DSF writing was metaphorical, these meta-
phors would render neuroscientific texts less compre-
hensible rather than serve as helpful rhetorical tools.
Undeniably, metaphors often aid scientific explanations
and thought (Brown, 2003; Chew & Laubichler, 2003).1California Institute of Technology, 2Tel Aviv University
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However, metaphors can also confine science to a specific
theory or mindset (Avise, 2001), evoke false conjunctions
(LaBerge, 1995), or lead to inappropriate generalizations
(Chew & Laubichler, 2003). Thus, metaphors can and
sometimes do lead scientists astray, and DSF writing is a
case in point. As we demonstrate below, the DSF adds
nothing to the comprehensibility of neuroscientific theo-
ries. Instead, it purposelessly and potentially harmfully
alludes to many readersʼ dualistic intuitions. In that, it
unnecessarily complicates and derails the search for a
comprehensive explanation of mind–brain relations by
creating the false impression of explaining what has in fact
remained obscure.
WHY DSF WRITING IS DUALISTIC
We argue that DSF writing reinforces what are already
hard-to-shake dualistic intuitions, giving them superficially
tempting although actually misleading neuroscientific legit-
imacy. The structure of Descartesʼ classical dichotomy be-
tween body and soul (Descartes, 1985) is remarkably
preserved in some modern neuroscientific texts, yet now
the dichotomy is portrayed as a dichotomy between the
self and its brain. Compare the two following texts:
…our brains can often decide well, in seconds, or
minutes, depending on the time frame we set as
appropriate for the goal we want to achieve, and if
they can do so, they must do the marvelous job with
more than just pure reason. (our emphases)
…the activity of the soul consists entirely in the fact
that simply by willing something it brings it about that
the little gland to which it is closely joined moves in
themanner required to produce the effect corresponding
to this volition. (our emphases)
The texts are similarly dualistic. In both, the self/soul
appears in charge of strategy, whereas the brain/gland
translates it into tactics. Yet, whereas the second text is
by the father of dualism, René Descartes (Descartes,
1985, CSM I:343), the first is from Antonio Damasioʼs
well-known book Descartesʼ error: emotion, reason, and
the human brain (Damasio, 1994, pp. 172–173).
Similarly, Chris Frith writes: “Your brain doesnʼt tell you
when your body moved in a different way from what you
intended” (Frith, 2007, p. 70), or suggests that “we” can
outdo the tricks our brains play on us and trick them back
by taking drugs, specifically LSD, so that we actively make
our brains lie to us (i.e., change our perception; pp. 34–
35). Such writing cannot be accommodated within a mate-
rialistic framework (as Frith acknowledges, p. 23). If “you”
are divergent from “your brain,” where do “you” reside in
a materialistic model, and what differentiates “you” from
“your brain” and allows an interaction between the two?
We claim that DSF writing is incompatible with a mate-
rialistic world view. In its most simplified form—that is,
identity theory (Smart, 1959)—materialism holds that
mental states are identical to brain states. Thus, if the brain
and the person have two opposing mental states (e.g., in
“the brain knows before you do,” the brainʼs state is know-
ing and the selfʼs not knowing), they also have two oppos-
ing brain states. This does not make much sense. The
problem persists also in “lighter” versions of materialism,
like supervenience (Kim, 1998), which postulates that
there cannot be any mental change without an underlying
neural change. Hence, if the brain and the person have
different mental states, they should again have diverging
brain states, reminiscent of the example above (a similar
argument holds for emergence theories; see, e.g., Van Gulick,
2001).
Finally, this argument also applies to emergentist the-
ories, which have gained traction in the neuroscientific
community (or, as Michael Gazzaniga put is, “there
seems to be a change in the air…. The leading neuro-
scientists are beginning to accept emergence”; Gazzaniga,
2010, p. 292). According to this approach, mental states
emerge from and are reducible to neural states, but they
are not identical with them and can also causally affect
them (i.e., weak emergentism or emergent materialism;
Stephan, 2006). DSF writing is incompatible with this world
view too; the casual interaction the theory allows is be-
tween macro (mental states) and micro (neural states)
properties of the brain, not between macro properties of
the brain and those of the person to whom the brain
belongs. Therefore, DSF writing cannot coexist with mate-
rialistic thought in its different versions (even for those
who acknowledge that mental states are real and can have
causal powers; see again the discussion of emergence
above). Given the strong tie commonly suggested between
neuroscience and materialism (Cacioppo & Decety, 2009;
Haggard, 2005; Crick, 1994; Edelman, 1989), it is remark-
able that such nonmaterialistic conceptions still find their
way into neuroscientific writing.
The criticism we offer here does not reflect our own
commitment to a specific ontological stand in the
mind–body conundrum. Nor do we deny the reality of
mental states (either in the emergentist sense above or
in the functional one, according to which mental states
are defined solely by their function and are accordingly
different and separate from the neural states that realize
them; Rey, 1997; Shoemaker, 1981; Putnam, 1967). Rather,
we hold that mental states—irrespective of how these are
defined—are states of the person and cannot be described
as conflicting with another set of mental states, which are
states of the personʼs brain.
WHY DSF WRITING SHOULD BE AVOIDED IN
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
Apart from reflecting dualistic notions, we claim that DSF
writing—even if regarded as metaphorical or figurative—
is detrimental to cognitive neuroscience and should be
avoided. First, it introduces unnecessary confusions into
a discipline that often encounters conceptual, operational,
212 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 27, Number 2
and analysis-related difficulties in its ongoing endeavor to
discover the neural underpinnings of cognitive and mental
processes (e.g., Maoz et al., 2015; Ioannidis, Munafò,
Fusar-Poli, Nosek, & David, 2014; Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011; Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009;
Mele, 2007; Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Block, 1995). Cognitive
neuroscientists, conducting pioneering work, have a hard
enough time steering clear of subtle confounds while often
investigating ill-defined phenomena; there is no need to
add conceptual confusions to this already-challenging
work by describing the brain and the person to whom it
belongs as two separate subjects, capable of interacting
and having divergentmental states. Second, as such writing
appeals to everyday intuitions about the existence of a
conscious self that is divergent from its corporeal body
(Bloom, 2005; Damasio, 1994), it obfuscates that which
has yet to be explained—how the human mind works and
how it is subserved by the brain.
Let us take Damasioʼs quote above as a case in point.
The text is a part of his account of decision-making, in
which emotion plays a crucial part (i.e., the somatic-
marker theory; Damasio, Everitt, & Bishop, 1996). The
somatic-marker hypothesis offers much explanatory power
about emotional involvement in decision-making and
makes testable predictions (e.g., that patients with im-
paired emotional functioning would demonstrate poorer
decision-making). However, it is harder to decipher from
Damasioʼs description what the neural underpinnings of
this emotional contribution to deciding are.
Saying that the brain relies on “more than pure reason”
to decide how to execute the actions required to achieve
the goals “we want to achieve” (our emphasis) does not
explain how “we” choose these goals. More importantly,
the division between the processes of deciding which
goals should be achieved (of which the person, or
“we,” are in charge) and those of deciding how to execute
those goals (assigned here to the brain) is left unexplained.
Is this a division between subjectsʼ conscious experience
of deciding and the underlying neural mechanisms? If so,
this is a fascinating, widely discussed division that requires
an explanation. Yet, we claim that Damasioʼs description
above provides no such explanation; rather than explaining
the brainʼs involvement in decision-making and in volun-
tary action and its enigmatic relations with our conscious
experience of reaching these decisions, the description
above relies on newer neural terms (e.g., the brain, the
frontal lobes, the nervous system) to convey long-standing
ideas (i.e., that the conscious self somehow controls the
brain and the body). This leaves more unexplained than
is initially apparent. Such usage of neural terms creates
the false impression that a new, neuroscientific theory or
explanation of the relations between mind and brain has
been put forward.
Similarly, there is no explanatory gain in saying that the
brain does not “tell you” about your bodily movements
(Frith, 2007, p. 70). We suggest that a better phrasing
is that you are unaware of these movements (for other
examples of DSF-free formulations of DSF writing, see
Table 1). Here, as in other neuroscientific texts (e.g.,
Aamodt & Wang, 2008; Fine, 2006; Baars, 1997), be-
havioral findings are described in a “neural language,”
making them appear to rely on neural data. However,
these texts actually describe dissociation between two
behaviors, two neural states, or two mental states—
one driven by conscious processes and the other driven
by unconscious processes. Importantly, both belong to
the person and occur in or are substantiated by the
personʼs brain. There is therefore no reason or gain
in describing the conscious state as belonging to the
person and the unconscious one as belonging to the
brain. Such DSF descriptions reinforce dualistic intui-
tions, while masking the fact that no new explanation
has been put forward for the difference between con-
scious and unconscious states and their underlying neural
mechanisms.
This confusion about the appropriate description of
conscious and unconscious processes revives the dualis-
tic mind–body dichotomy, as exemplified in sentences
like “there is a dissociation between what the brain
knows and what the patient claims to experience” (Baars,
1997, p. 366). This sentence describes a blindsight patient
(Weiskrantz, 1996; Farah, 1994) who denies seeing a pair
of scissors yet is able to reach for them. This once again
reflects dissociation between two cognitive or neural
states: the patientʼs conscious experience and the patientʼs
unconscious processing of the information of which she
is unaware. Yet, it is described as dissociation between
what the brain “knows” and what the patient does.
Note that, in this example and in others of its kind,
what the brain “knows” is what the person does not:
the unconsciously processed information. One does not
write of the brain “knowing” when describing conscious
experiences; it is only unconscious processes that are
assigned to the brain. The conscious processes are
assigned to the person. We claim that this reflects the
hidden dualistic conception that conscious states are
states of the person but not of the personʼs brain, whereas
unconscious states belong to the personʼs brain rather
than to the person as awhole.Wedeem this intuitive notion
dualistic because it rejects the idea that both conscious
and unconscious states are states of the person that are
instantiated by her brain, as we explain above. People
are able to consciously experience the world and uncon-
sciously process many aspects of it, sometimes to a sur-
prisingly high degree (e.g., Reber, Luechinger, Boesiger,
& Henke, 2014; Sklar et al., 2012; Mudrik, Breska, Lamy,
& Deouell, 2011; Lau & Passingham, 2007). Both the con-
scious experiences and the unconscious processes result
from neural activity. The challenge of understanding the
interplay of conscious and unconscious processes in
shaping human experience is a key one that lies ahead
for cognitive neuroscience (see Raffone, Srinivasan, &
van Leeuwen, 2014, for a recent collection of articles).
However, to meet this challenge, it would be wise to
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overcome the old dualistic intuitions and to face the
problem head on. We have only made baby steps in un-
derstanding the relations between mind and brain, and
many fundamental problems are still unsolved. Until we
stand on firmer empirical and theoretical grounds, we
had better acknowledge these problems rather than
obfuscate them by describing brains as intentional sub-
jects that are able to interact with the persons to whom
they belong. Such personification of the brain renders
the discussion of mind–body relations too shallow and
presents an incredibly complicated issue in an overly
simplistic manner.
WHY DSF WRITING IS ALSO PROBLEMATIC
OUTSIDE THE SCIENTIFIC ARENA
Thus far, we discussed the scientific and theoretical
ramifications of committing the DSF. Yet, this way of
thinking has further repercussions, for example, in the
moral and legal domains: when “I” am separated from
“my brain,” which actually makes the decisions “for
me,” how can “I” be responsible for “my brainʼs” actions
(or are they “my” actions)?
Philosophers and law scholars have been debating the
scope and extent of moral responsibility for centuries,
mostly in the context of free will and determinism (to name
a few: Kane, 2002; Smilansky, 2000; Honderich, 1988;
Zimmerman, 1988; Dennett, 1984; Fischer & Ravizza,
1984; Nagel, 1976; Frankfurt, 1969; Hart, 1968; Strawson,
1962; Schlick, 1939). However, this debate has now
donned a new guise: the distinction between “me” and
“my brain” that also permeates the daily praxis of the judi-
cial realm. This is manifested in the “my brain made me do
it” defense (Maoz & Yaffe, 2013; Sternberg, 2010), which is
becoming increasingly popular (but see Gazzaniga, 2006;
Morse, 2004; also relevant is the account of preconscious
free will in Velmans, 2003).
For example, Jonathan Pincus, an expert on criminal
behavior and the brain, writes: “When a composer con-
ceives a symphony, the only way he or she can present
it to the public is through an orchestra…. If the perfor-
mance is poor, the fault could lie with the composerʼs
conception, or the orchestra, or both…. Will is expressed
by the brain. Violence can be the result of volition
only, but if a brain is damaged, brain failure must be at
least partly to blame” (Pincus, 2001, p. 128). The brain
is here equated with the orchestra; the perpetratorʼs
will, with the composer; and the violent act, with poor
performance. If the musical performance is poor be-
cause of the orchestra, it is not the composerʼs fault.
Thus, if the violent act is because of a damaged brain,
the perpetratorʼs culpability should be mitigated. There-
fore, in this analogy, the perpetratorʼs will is as divergent
from her brain as the composerʼs symphony is from the
orchestra (Greene & Cohen, 2004). The analogy relies on
the intuition that a defendantʼs responsibility is mitigated
if her actions can be attributed to some anomaly in her
brain. This intuition is, at least to some extent, valid and
reflected in the law. However, its description is problem-
atic, differentiating between the self and the brain that
“made” the self act illegally, as if the two can interact as
two intentional subjects. This is another version of the
DSF. This seepage into the judicial realm is more reason
for neuroscientists to take care not to commit the DSF.
It should be noted that we do not claim that moral
responsibility is impossible within a materialistic frame-
work. Although moral responsibility is often described
in relation to the notion of free will, which many consider
to rely on dualistic ideas (Knobe, 2014; Montague, 2008;
Bloom, 2007; Nichols, 2004), others suggest that folk
conceptions of moral responsibility are not correlated
with dualistic intuitions (Monroe, Dillon, & Malle, 2014;
Nahmias & Thompson, 2014). Along the same lines, it
has been claimed that neuroscience threatens neither
the notion of free will nor that of moral responsibility
and may, in contrast, lead to a better understanding of
these concepts (Roskies, 2006). However, for this to hap-
pen, especially given the complexity of these issues and
their important social implications, neuroscientists
should avoid referring to “me” versus “my brain.” When
brain scientists make this false distinction—no matter
how many times they deny any dualistic tendencies—
those around them treat it as the word of the experts,
thus strengthening the dualistic intuitions that drive
DSF writing inside and outside neuroscience.
WHY DSF WRITING COMES ABOUT
Why are dualistic-oriented descriptions like the DSF
found in the writing of professed materialists? Frith
explains that he sometimes “sounds like a dualist,” dif-
ferentiating between “me” and “my brain,” because “this
is what experience is like” (Frith, 2007, p. 23). He seems
to be suggesting that humans experience themselves in
dualistic terms, which are reflected in DSF writing. This
dualistic approach, cultivated and augmented for centuries
by culture and religion (Boyer, 2001; Petrement, 1973),
is indeed prevalent, appearing already at 4 or 5 years old
(Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bloom, 2004).
However, dualism by itself does not bring about DSF
writing; it is the intersection between the neuroscientific
endeavor to explain mind–body relations in neural terms
and the closet dualism of neuroscientists that gives rise
to this confused way of writing. Scientifically and cultur-
ally, we seem to be in the midst of a transition period in
our understanding of mind–brain relations, gradually
moving away from long-held dualistic intuitions to more
materialistic ones. Referring to the brain as the locus of
thought and behavior is increasingly common. Much of
this transition is driven by the cognitive-neuroscientific en-
deavor to piece together a neural account of the functions
of the mind and to explain phenomena previously held
nonphysical and unscientific, like rationality ( Jastorff,
Clavagnier, Gergely, & Orban, 2011; De Martino, Kumaran,
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Table 1. Examples of the DSF
Publication Publication Type Field Interaction Type Quote (Representative Example) Rephrasing to Remove the DSF
Aamodt &
Wang, 2008
Popular science book General neuroscience Lying brain versus owner who should
try to detect the brainʼs lies
“Your brain lies to you a lot…[it]has to take
shortcuts and make lots of assumptions.
Your brainʼs lies are in your best interest—
most of the time—but they also lead to
predicable mistakes. One of our goals is to
help you understand the types of shortcuts
and hidden assumptions your brain uses to
get you through life. We hope this knowledge
will make it easier for you to predict when
your brain is a source of reliable information
and when itʼs likely to mislead you.” (p. 2)
“Your experience is often illusory…. It rests on
shortcuts and lots of assumptions. These illusions
are in your best interest—most of the time—but
they also lead to predicable mistakes. One of
our goals is to help you understand the types of
shortcuts and hidden assumptions that get you
through life. We hope this knowledge will make
it easier for you to predict when your conscious
experience is a source of reliable information
and when itʼs likely to mislead you.”
Baars, 1997 Theoretical article,
consciousness and
cognition
Consciousness and
attention, blindsight
Knowing brain versus unknowing
brain owner
“If we hold a pair of scissors before the
eyes of blindsight patients, they would
claim not to see anything, yet they might
be able to reach for the scissors with
thumb and forefinger extended to insert
into the scissor loops. Thus, we can verify
that some part of the visual brain knows
about the scissors, though the patient
disclaims any direct perceptual knowledge.
There is a dissociation between what
the brain knows and what the patient
claims to experience.” (p. 366)
“If we hold a pair of scissors before the eyes of
blindsight patients, they would claim not to
see anything, yet they might be able to reach
for the scissors with thumb and forefinger
extended to insert into the scissor loops.
Thus, we can verify that some part of the
visual brain processes information about the
scissors, though the patient disclaims any
direct perceptual knowledge. There is a
dissociation between what is being
unconsciously processed and what is
being consciously experienced.”
Cerf et al., 2010 Research article, Nature Online control of
neural activation
(*authorsʼ definition)
Controlled brain versus controlling
brain owner
“…humans can regulate the activity of their
neurons in the medial temporal lobe.”
(article abstract)
“Sensory feedback on successful attention
allocation can modify the activity of neurons
in the medial temporal lobe.”
Damasio, 1994 Popular science book Decision-making Executing brain versus a willing
and goal-setting brain owner
“…our brains can often decide well, in seconds,
or minutes, depending on the time frame
we set as appropriate for the goal we want
to achieve, and if they can do so, they must
do the marvelous job with more than just
pure reason.” (pp. 172–173)
“…decision processes in the brain are often
successfully carried out, in seconds, or minutes,
depending on the personʼs goal and time frame
(possibly defined by higher level brain areas),
and if this can occur, the brain must do the
marvelous job with more than just pure reason.”
An alternative interpretation:
“…we can often decide well, in seconds,
or minutes, depending on the time frame
we set as appropriate for the goal we want to
achieve, and if we can do so, we must do the
marvelous job with more than just pure reason.”
Fine, 2006 Popular science book Social neuroscience Lying brain versus a naive
brain owner
“Donʼt trust your brain…. [it] manipulates
your perception of reality, thus tricking
you into embracing vanities…donʼt feel
too angry with your vain brain for
shielding you from the truth.” (p. 23)
“Donʼt trust your conscious experience…your
perception of reality is inaccurate, which
leads you to embrace vanities…donʼt
feel too angry towards your illusory
experience (or the unconscious mechanisms
that underlie it) for shielding you from the truth.”
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Table 1. (continued )
Publication Publication Type Field Interaction Type Quote (Representative Example) Rephrasing to Remove the DSF
Frith, 2007 Popular science book Consciousness Manipulative brain versus a
brain owner who tries to
overcome the brainʼs
deceptions
“Our brain doesnʼt tell us everything it
knows. And sometimes it goes further
and actively misleads us.” (p. 47)
“We donʼt have conscious access to all the
information processed by our brains. And
sometimes our conscious experience is
misleading.”
Gazzaniga, 2006 Popular science book Neuroscience and
understanding the
mind
Knowing/deciding brain versus
unknowing brain owner who is
led by his or her brain
“Thus, it seems the brain knows our
decisions before we do.” (p. 145)
“Thus, is seems that decision processes are carried
out unconsciously before we have conscious
access to them.”
Gazzaniga, 2000 Book chapter Neuroscience and
understanding the
mind
Knowing/deciding brain versus
unknowing brain owner who is
led by his or her brain
“You know how active the automatic
brain is, especially when you are
awakened at 3 a.m. by a profusion
of concerns swirling around in your
mind. You canʼt get back to sleep
because your brain is in charge.”
(p. 171)
“You know how active the automatic brain is,
especially when you are awakened at 3 a.m.
by a profusion of concerns swirling around
in your mind. You canʼt get back to sleep
because you canʼt control your thoughts.”
Grinde, 1996 Theoretical article,
Journal of Social and
Evolutionary Systems
The neural basis of
visual aesthetics
Rewarding and persuading brain
versus an obedient brain owner
“…the brain is constructed to evoke
these feelings as a means of helping you.
Similarly, going to the toilet may not be
conceived as a favorite source of joy,
but your brain does reward you for
emptying your bowels, because it is a
natural and necessary action.” (p. 33)
“…the brain is constructed to evoke these
advantageous feelings. Similarly, going to the
toilet may not be conceived of as a favorite
source of joy, but the reward system
in your brain is active after emptying your
bowels, because it is a natural and necessary
action.”
Isnard, Magnim,
Jung, Mauguière,
Garcia-Larrea, 2011
Research article, pain Pain Executive brain notified about
the sensation of its owner
“Does the insula tell our brain that we
are in pain?” (article title)
“Does the insula decode/signal the sensation
of pain?”
Keysers and
Perrett, 2002
Theoretical article,
Trends in Cognitive
Sciences
Consciousness Operating brain versus an
operated brain owner
“Our brain makes ‘us’ aware of only one
of these interpretations at a time by
letting the alternatives compete
neuronally.” (p. 24)
“Our brain activity results in awareness of only
one of these interpretations at a time
via neuronal competition between the
alternatives.”
Koch, 2012 Popular science book Consciousness,
free will
Deciding brain versus inferring
subject
“In terms of Libetʼs experiment, your
brain decides that now is a good
time to flex the wrist, and the readiness
potential builds up. A bit later, the neural
correlate of agency becomes active.
It is to this percept that you incorrectly
attribute causality. As these events take
place in a flash, under a second, itʼs not
easy to catch them.” (p. 107)
“In terms of Libetʼs experiment, unconscious
processes initiate the flexion of the wrist, and
the readiness potential builds up. A bit
later, the neural correlate of agency
becomes active. It is to this conscious
percept that you incorrectly attribute
causality. As these events take place in
a flash, under a second, itʼs not easy to
catch them.”
Koch, 2009 Book chapter Free will Deciding brain versus unknowing
subject
“I discuss several cognitive neuroscience
experiments suggesting that in many
instances, our brain decides prior to our
conscious mind, and that we are often
ignorant of our brainʼs decisions.”
(chapter abstract)
“I discuss several cognitive neuroscience
experiments suggesting that in many instances,
unconscious decisions occur prior to
our conscious experience of deciding,
and that we are often ignorant of these
unconscious processes.”
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Kornmeier &
Bach, 2009
Research article,
Journal of Vision
Consciousness A brain that is impressed by
external stimuli versus brain
owner who does not notice
them
“Object perception: When our brain is
impressed but we do not notice it”
(article title)
Object perception: When we are unconsciously
impressed but do not consciously notice it”
LeDoux, 2002 Popular science book The relations between
synapses and the self
Dominating brain versus brain
owner who tries to get free
using downward causation
“This [the fact that unconscious
emotional systems affect our behavior,
L. M. & U. M.] doesnʼt mean that
weʼre simply victims of our brains
and should just give into our urges.
It means that downward causation is
sometimes hard work.” (p. 323)
“This [the fact that unconscious emotional
systems affect our behavior, L. M. & U. M.]
doesnʼt mean that weʼre simply victims
of these unconscious processes and
should just give into our urges. It means
that downward causation is sometimes
hard work.”
Leyden &
Kleinig, 2008
Research article,
Medical Hypotheses
BGʼs role in
data processing
Executing brain versus a willing
and goal-setting brain owner
“If a person wants to move a limb to
a new position, the brain decides
exactly what muscle fibers to use
with what force.”
“If a person wants to move a limb to a new
position, neural processes in her
brain excite the exact muscle fibers with
the appropriate force.”
Libet, 2003;
Libet et al., 1983
Research articles;
Brain, Journal of
Consciousness Studies
Free will Deciding brain versus a willing
brain owner
1. “…conscious free will could not
actually ‘tell’ the brain to begin its
preparation to carry out a voluntary act.”
(Libet, 2003, p. 24)
1. “…subjectsʼ conscious experience of deciding
could not actually initiate the neural preparation
to carry out a voluntary act.”
2. “…the brain evidently ‘decides’ to
initiate or, at the least, prepare to
initiate the act at a time before there
is any reportable subjective awareness
that such a decision has taken place.”
(Libet et al., 1983, p. 640)
2. “…unconscious brain processes evidently
initiate or, at the least, prepare to initiate
the act at a time before there is any
reportable subjective awareness that such a
decision has taken place.”
Moseley, 2003 Research article,
Journal of Pain
Pain Deciding brain versus an
experiencing brain owner
“The brain decides when you will
experience pain.”
“The brain gives rise to the experience of pain.”
Ornstein, 1992 Popular science book Consciousness Deciding brain versus a later
experiencing brain owner
“It is as if the brain, below our awareness,
spends half a second deciding whether
we should be allowed to know what just
happened. If it decides that it is best that
we know, then it also informs us.”
(p. 147)
“It is as if attentional mechanisms, below our
awareness, spend half a second processing
what just happened in order to select on what
to focus. The information that was selected then
becomes conscious.”
Alternative interpretation:
“It is as if unconscious processes, below our
awareness, spend half a second filtering what
just happened. Whatever survives this filtering
(i.e., corresponds to our unconscious
defense mechanisms), becomes conscious.”
Pearson &
Clifford, 2005
Research article,
Psychological Science
Consciousness Deciding brain versus an
experiencing brain owner
“When your brain decides what you see:
Grouping across monocular, binocular,
and stimulus rivalry” (article title)
“When neural processes determine the contents
of your perception: Grouping across monocular,
binocular, and stimulus rivalry”
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Table 1. (continued )
Publication Publication Type Field Interaction Type Quote (Representative Example) Rephrasing to Remove the DSF
Rizzolatti &
Sinigaglia, 2008
Popular science book Mirror neurons Understanding brain that
interprets motor competencies
versus brain owner who uses
high cognitive faculties
“…we could use our higher cognitive
faculties to reflect on what we have
perceived and infer the intentions,
expectations or motivations of
others that would provide us with a
reason for their acts, but our brain is
able to understand these latter
immediately on the basis of
motor competencies alone,
without the need of any kind of
reasoning.” (p. xii)
“…we could use our higher cognitive faculties
to reflect on what we have perceived
and infer the intentions, expectations
or motivations of others that would provide
us with a reason for their acts, but we
are unconsciously able to understand
these latter immediately on the basis
of motor competencies alone, without the
need of any kind of reasoning.”
Simon et al., 2010 Research article, Cortex Memory disorders Remembering brain
versus forgetting
brain owner
“When the brain remembers, but the
patient doesnʼt: Converging fMRI
and EEG evidence for covert
recognition in a case of
prosopagnosia” (article title)
“When there are neural memory traces but the
patient doesnʼt remember: Converging
fMRI and EEG evidence for covert
recognition in a case of prosopagnosia”
Smythies, 2005 Review article,
Journal of the
Royal Society of
Medicine
Consciousness Deciding brain versus an
experiencing brain owner
“How the brain decides what we see”
(article title)
“How neural processes determine the contents
of your perception”
Soon et al., 2008 Research article Free will Deciding brain versus a later
informed brain owner
“…the brain had already unconsciously
made a decision to move even
before the subject became aware of it”
(p. 543)
“…unconscious motor-preparatory neural
activity began even before the subject
became aware of it.”
Sternberg, 2010 Popular science book Free will and moral
responsibility
Brain in charge versus
owner held responsible
My brain made me do it: The rise of
neuroscience and the threat to
moral responsibility (book title)
The rise of neuroscience and the threat to
moral responsibility (book title)
Wehrenberg, 2011 Popular science book Depression A brain that makes its owner
depressed versus a brain
owner who tries to change
his or her brain
“…you can use your brain to change
your brain.” (p. 11).
“…your behavior can change your brain.”
Book title: The 10 best-ever depression
management techniques:
Understanding how your
brain makes you depressed
and what you can do to change it
Book title: The best-ever depression
management techniques: Understanding
the neural mechanisms that cause
your depression and how to change them
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Seymour, & Dolan, 2006), morality (Parkinson et al., 2011;
Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008; Moll, Zahn, de Oliveira-
Souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Greene, Nystrom, Engell,
Darley, & Cohen, 2004), the self (Gillihan & Farah, 2005;
Decety & Sommerville, 2003; Kircher & David, 2003),
consciousness (Tononi, 2013; Dehaene & Changeux, 2011;
Crick & Koch, 2003), or free will (Maoz et al., 2015; Haggard,
2005, 2008; Soon et al., 2008; Libet, Gleason, Wright, &
Pearl, 1983). Tectonic conceptual motion of this sort is
seldom smooth, as the DSF exemplifies.2
Possibly, as part of its growing prominence and cultural
importance, there is a recent strive in the cognitive sci-
ences to improve working practices and arrive at more
standardized and reproducible methods of gathering, ana-
lyzing, and reporting data (e.g., Cumming, 2014; Ioannidis
et al., 2014; Simmons et al., 2011). This would be consider-
ably reinforced by an accompanying strive for awareness
of the underlying assumptions in the field and when they
are violated. DSF writing is an important example of such a
violation.
Scientists and philosophers warn that dualistic thinking,
prevailing among lay people (Bloom, 2004, 2005; Damasio,
1994), is both wrong and socially dangerous (Dawkins,
2006; Greene, 2006). This is doubly true for the writings
of neuroscientists, who the public perceives as authorities
on the brain and the mind and possibly as role models
for careful and rigorous thinking. When dualistic notions
among neuroscientists and the general public weaken
enough for humans to intuitively interpret DSF writing in
nondualistic terms, committing the DSF would be merely
sloppy. Until then, if cognitive neuroscience is to advance
toward its goal of providing a clear and coherent account of
the brain as the foundation for the mind, neuroscientists
should pay more attention to lurking closet dualism and
would do well to steer clear of the DSF.
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Notes
1. Importantly, this fallacy does not depend on rejecting the
personification of the brain (termed by Bennett and Hacker
[2003] as “the mereological fallacy”—the ascription of psycho-
logical predicates to the brain or its parts). Hence, even if one
accepts the ascription of psychological predicates to the brain
(e.g., if one allows sentences like “the brain decides” or “the brain
wants”; see Bennett & Hacker, 2003; Chomsky, 1995, for criti-
cism), one should reject the ascription of opposing psychological
predicates to the brain and its owner (e.g., “the brain decides be-
fore you do” or “the brain wants but I donʼt”). Below, we explain
why this opposition cannot be accommodated within a material-
istic point of view and why it confuses neuroscientific writing.
2. In that respect, there are ongoing debates about other
potential fallacies in neuroscience, such as whether conscious-
ness holds any special function (e.g., Mudrik, Faivre, & Koch,
2014; Baars, 2005; Block, 1995), the role of causality in neuro-
science (e.g., Campbell, OʼRourke, & Silverstein, 2007), the
scope and explanatory power of reductionism in neuroscience
(e.g., Bickle, 1998, 2003), and the role of the brain in the free-
will and moral-responsibility debates (e.g., Maoz & Yaffe, forth-
coming; Maoz et al., 2015; Haggard, 2008). The DSF and its
origin may be related to these debates.
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